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Pronouncements of its Impending Demise were Exaggerated: 
The EuroMed Partnership Morphing into  
a Regional Security Super Complex
♦ 
 
Astrid B. Boening
♣ 
 
Introduction 
 
The  security  issues  facing  the  countries  bordering  the  Mediterranean  today  are  addressed 
bilaterally (especially pertaining to those countries bordering the Mediterranean on both shores), 
inter-regionally  (e.g.  between  the  Euro-Mediterranean  region  and  the  Black  Sea  region), 
multilaterally (e.g. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue), and also, as I am proposing here: (super-) 
regionally in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex – and, extrapolated, a 
transatlantic Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC), utilizing Buzan 
and Waever’s (2003) terminology. One might view this apparent alignment in terms of Henry 
Kissinger’s (2008) observations:   
      No  previous  generation  has  had  to  deal  with  different  revolutions 
occurring  simultaneously  in  separate  parts  of  the  world[:]  …  (a)  the 
transformation  of  the  traditional  state  system  of  Europe;  (b)  the  radical 
Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the 
center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. 
 
Objectives: De-securitizing a regional security complex?! 
 
Ulla Holm (2004, 1) viewed the dialectic faced by the European Union (EU) in the Mediterranean 
in terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great 
civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone. This is interlinked with the discourses of the EU as 
an exporter of democracy through a model to copy (rather than as empire-builder) through respect 
for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting political shared European values. 
Spencer (2001, 18) notes that the development of relations of trust has as the end goal of security  
“the absence of war”: we need to distance ourselves from the colonial victim-victimizer mindset 
but emancipate ourselves, regardless of which role some may have had a hundred years ago. In 
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this  context,  the  route  proposed  by  Amartya  Sen  (1999)  in  promoting  development  as  a 
significant route to freedom is relevant. This freedom from war, want etc. does not occur in 
isolation  by  one  country  at  the  expense  of  another.  Peace-building  in  the  early  years  of  the 
EuroMed Partnership’s (EMP) existence can be characterized as an “automatic result of Euro-
Med economic cooperation, rather than as a comprehensive early warning/conflict prevention 
concept or policy” (Aliboni, Guazzone, and Pioppi 2001, introduction), although a start has been 
made by studies and resultant models by the Italian foreign ministry as well as by EuroMeSCo
1 or 
Cidob in particular in developing a broader concept for peacebuilding in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. 
       While there have been a number of political cooperation initiatives involving this region, the 
latest being French president Sarkozy’s proposal of a “Mediterranean Union”, in this paper I start 
with  an  analysis  of  some  the  security-related  dynamics  within  the  framework  of  the  EMP 
(Thornhill  2007a  and  2007b)
2,  often  referred  to  as  the  Barcelona  Process.  Studying  the 
Mediterranean as a geo-political region, Pace (2003, 161) states that “the study of regions must in 
some  way  include  the  study  of  meaning  and  identity”.  Other  authors,  such  as  Shamsaddin 
Megalommatis (2007) are of the opinion that, pertaining to the Arabic and Islamic neighbors of 
the EU, only Turkey and Iran matter at all. To re-think the Mediterranean region in a relational, 
political context, Pace (Ibid.) suggests focusing on agency and structure in the analysis of the 
“processual” aspects of region making.  
 
Regional Integration 
 
Intellectually, any regional integration is to be welcomed, such as e.g. the Arab League to counter 
Arab  division  (Chourou  2001,  68)  on  the  Southern  Mediterranean.  However,  I  would  guard 
against the founding of infinite organizations as their own process which will substitute action 
with only more talk. The EMP has the potential to be expanded greatly, especially under its new 
framework  as  the  Union  for  the  Mediterranean  (UMed),  within  the  concept  of  “security  as 
indivisible” (Deutsch). Path-dependency in the EMP with respect to accelerating integration is in 
relation to those socio-historical developments which favor its evolution, such as globalization 
pressures, international regimes and global governance.  
        Hence the EMP and its future potential, like the EU, can be analyzed i.a. according to a 
variety of integration theories, depending on the question asked about it. While both the EMP and 
the EU continue to evolve, at this point intra-regional economic, political and social integration in 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is weak (e.g. Schumacher 2004, 92). While north-south 
inter-regional  integration  between  MENA  and  the  EU  is  being  nourished,  inter-regional 
integration between MENA and regions to the east and west is also weak, but significant in light 
of the tectonic shifts some writers attribute to the current developments in Iran as well as in Iraq 
(e.g. Schumacher 2004, 95), as well as the unique dynamics of Jihadist terrorism
3 alluded to by 
Henry Kissinger.  
        This paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union 
(EU) and its southern Mediterranean neighbors in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it 
meaning, as well as potentially leading to a reciprocal “re-construction” of their self-identity 
(compare e.g. Wendt 1999) in the context of a regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 
                                                           
     
1 EuroMeSCo as a network of independent institutes from the thirty-seven member countries of the EMP, 
functioning “both as an official confidence-building measure within the EMP and as a source of analytical expertise in 
the policy and security fields with which it is concerned (EuroMeSCo website). 
      
2  Since  the  newly  agreed  upon  “Union  for  the  Mediterranean”  will  not  be  inaugurated  until  July  2008,  its 
modifications to the EMP will be addressed in this paper, but its dynamics are speculative for now. 
     
3 as it rejects “national sovereignty based on secular state models” (Kissinger 2008, 1) as it is based on religion, not 
states, and does not recognize the legitimacy of the international system nor the internal structure of existing states 
(Ibid., 2)..  
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1998  and  2003).  This  analysis  gained  renewed  prominence  following  the  emergence  of  the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of 1999 and “the need to examine the security and 
defence dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” (Heisbourg 2001, 5). 
 
The EuroMed Partnership and some Security Implications 
 
Spencer (2001, 14), among other authors, also recognizes geographical proximity as contributing 
to a “blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key 
concern  to  the  EU,  namely  the  very  human  issue  of  migration  in  all  its  dimensions”.  This 
necessitates i.a. addressing the economic insufficiencies of the “sending” states which lead to 
emigration  out  of  this  despair  (i.e.  mostly  from  northern  Africa  to  the  southern  EU),  and 
cooperating  in  the  repatriation  of  these  EU-immigrants.  Of  course,  some  authors  (such  as 
Chourou 2001, 58) doubt that “security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all” 
unless  there  are  very  long-term  considerations,  and  that  “participation  must  be  open  to  all 
countries  that  have  clear  stakes  in  the  issues  to  be  discussed  even  if  such  countries  are  not 
Mediterranean in strict geographical terms” (Chourou 2001, 59/60). 
        In a world which is in greater political and socio-economic transformation than ever before, 
I  propose  an  adjustment  to  the  Regional  Security  Complex  Theory  delineated  by  Buzan  and 
Waever (2003) with respect to the Middle East Regional Security Complex in favor of a Euro-
Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC) to more accurately represent the complex 
socio-economic and political inter-linkages and dynamics in fact observed. While this proposal 
requires  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  complex  issues  and  supporting  data  involved  in  this 
theoretical construct of an EMRSC, space limitations permit only a brief overview over a small 
sample  of  its  issues  and  their  dynamics,  in  addition  to  brief  references  to  other  authors’ 
observations, which would also point towards my hypothesis. 
        This paper draws on the sectors and levels proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) 
in their new framework for security analysis. Beyond the military sector it would also include e.g. 
environmental,  terrorist  threats  (as  transnational,  mostly  non-state  actor,  and  often  civil  law 
enforcement  threats),  as  well  as  energy,  food  and  water,  drug  and  arms  trafficking, 
economic/financial,  and  individual  (e.g.  human  trafficking)  security  “sectors”.  The  “levels” 
pertaining to a theoretical EMRSC are i.a. the sub/intra-regional (e.g. from some viewpoints the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the inter-regional (e.g. the Euro-Mediterranean region and the Black 
Sea  region),  the  bilateral  level  (e.g.  France  and  Morocco),  the  international  (i.e.  the  foreign 
relations  between  the  states  within  and  outside  the  regions  in  question),  and,  lastly,  as  Van 
Langenhove (2008) proposed, a neo-Westphalian level. This last level is from a viewpoint of 
global governance where the world of states gradually becomes “a world of states and of regions” 
(Van  Langenhove  2008a,  115)  (italics  mine).  This  concept  of  neo-Westphalian  “Second 
Generation  Regionalism”  (Van  Langenhove  2008b)  identified  integration  in  non-economic 
matters such as justice, security, culture (Ibid.).  
         There  are  a  multitude  of  considerations  for  Europe’s  engagement  in  MENA.  The  EMP 
constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North 
Africa
4. Additionally, Euro-Mediterranean security in many forms of course has been front page 
news in this region especially since World War II at least, only to catapult to a higher priority for 
a number of reasons. Beyond the security implications of the economic disparities within MENA 
and between it and the EU, indirect issues arise through societal security, e.g. when thousands of 
mostly economic refugees leave North Africa annually on a dangerous Mediterranean crossing to 
EU territory, such as the Canary Islands, Gibraltar or Italy. While this journey results in numerous 
                                                           
    
4 Although the relations between the EU and individual MENA countries are predominantly based on bilateral 
agreements (“action plans”) today. Additionally, although the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is presented 
externally  as  unified,  EU  member  countries,  especially  those  on  the  EU’s  southern  shore,  continue  to  maintain 
privileged bilateral diplomatic and economic relationships with some MENA countries.  
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fatalities among the refugees due to the treacherous transportation devices used, the arrival of the 
refugees in the EU represents a problem in terms of illegal and undocumented immigration at a 
time  of  increased  border  security  world  wide.  It  also  forces  the  EU  to  undertake  expensive 
repatriation  to  the  sometimes  uncooperative  countries  of  origin.  An  indirect  consequence  of 
unequal economic development is also its linkage to political unrest which in turns becomes 
fertile ground for terrorism in MENA and which has been spreading progressively to “the West”, 
including Europe. Zinn (2006) argues that war is not a successful approach to defeat terrorism by 
religious extremists, which continues to spread within and around MENA because it fails to 
address the causes of terrorism, be they insufficient civil society (e.g. local police enforcement, or 
inadequate social services to address the needs of the disadvantaged). 
         The  traditional  weak  link  in  Western  economic  security  is  energy.  The  most  recent 
challenge to the European Union’s energy security is its reliance on an increasingly mafia-like 
Russia and its client states, which are politically potentially more unstable than the Middle East. 
From an EU standpoint, the political and economic unreliability of Russia as a petroleum source 
became  exacerbated  i.a.  when  Russia  expanded  it’s  questionable  reputation  further  extra-
territorially by signing an agreement with Algeria to restrain foreign investments (particularly in 
the  petroleum  sector)  in  the  latter  country  (Dombey  2006),  and  hence  e.g.  impeding 
multilateralism and open markets in Algeria (an EMP member state).  
         In  the  context  of  energy  security  in  the  Euro-Med  region,  Libya,  though  currently  still 
holding observer status in the EMP due to the (recent lifting of the) international embargo, is 
being re-socialized into the organization. This issue rose to the top of negotiations recently when 
French president Sarkozy proposed the MU. At the time of this writing, the vague goals of the 
MU  have  been  transformed  into  the  proposed  Union  for  the  Mediterranean  (UMed),  whose 
inauguration is expected for July 2008 at the French EU summit. The UMed is anticipated to 
enhance the saliency of the EMP to achieve a more effective and deeper integration among its 
member states - the significance underscored by the State-owned Russian gas group, Gazprom, 
likely to secure energy assts in Libya (together with Eni) in order to gain “long-sought entry to 
north African oil and gas fields and tightening its grip on European markets” (Gorst 2008).   
 
The EuroMed Partnership: Growing up to be a (super-) regional Actor? 
 
This  paper  seeks  to  examine  the  interconnectedness  of  the  diverse  security  aspects  and  the 
reciprocal geo-political as well as socio-economic significance in the EuroMed Partnership from 
a regional perspective, as they continue to remain near the top of the security agendas of its 
member states in part as a result of the conflicts bordering it (i.e. Iran and Iraq) (Fernández 2007). 
Noting  that  Buzan,  Waever  and  de  Wilde  (1998)  are  diverging  from  the  traditional  military 
definition  of  security  by  adding  “soft”  areas,  such  as  economic,  environmental,  societal  and 
individual security, we turn to Joffé (2001, 55) who refers to the EMP as 
     a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have interesting social 
and cultural consequences and should be the real paradigm for the future … 
[where]  soft  power  projection  becomes  interdependence  as  the  ‘forgotten 
frontier’ becomes the common arena 
 – the stated objective of the Barcelona Process, if not its underlying purpose indeed: The EMP’s 
initial  specific  mandate  is  based  on  the  politically,  economically  and  culturally  strategic 
significance of the Mediterranean region to the EU. It seeks to develop a relationship between its 
partners  based  on  “comprehensive  cooperation  and  solidarity,  in  keeping  with  the  privileged 
nature  of  the  links  forged  by  neighbourhood  and  history”  (EU  Commission  website  2006: 
Barcelona  Declaration).  This  reflects  dynamics  of  a  security  community.  According  to  the 
literature today on development and the synchronicity between political, economic and societal 
security,  the  framework  of  the  EMP  was  conceptualized  from  the  beginning  to  provide  the  
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groundwork for accommodating this interconnectedness in the relationship between the neighbors 
along the Northern and Southern Mediterranean
5.  
          However,  upon  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  EMP  in  2005,  critical  voices  reflected 
impatience with this process
6. Nevertheless, despite the very short time period of the EMP’s 
existence,  indications  point  to  the  EMP  (and  its  anticipated  reemergence  as  the  UMed)  as 
evolving to be a more coherent and effective regional integration project. It is recognized that 
“economic  change  also  produces  social  change”  (Joffé  2001,  46).  The  proposals  for  future 
projects
7,  and  projects  already  accomplished  by  the  EMP  during  the  past  thirteen  years  are 
expected to lead to economic development and export-oriented growth in MENA, along with 
market-accessibility in the EU and hereby contribute to the reduction of political pressures having 
security consequences. Additionally, political and social transparency, and accountability are also 
required  as  factors  to  attract  foreign  direct  investments  to  ensure  successful  private  sector 
development (Ibid.).  
        These  economic  policies  and  changes  reciprocally  also  have  cultural  and  social 
consequences. The Barcelona Process originally already incorporated the framework to address 
these  in  terms  of  stimulating  the  growth  of  participatory  civil  society  within  the  context  of 
legitimized government (Joffé 2001, 47).  Reinhardt (2002) points out that the development of 
civil society, and especially exchanges and communications between the civil societies of the 
northern and southern Mediterranean and the movement of people within the EMP overall have 
not been facilitated sufficiently in the past. Reinhardt (2002, 20) writes that 
    As far as the lack of a sense of common ownership for the Partnership is 
concerned,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  constantly  complain  that  the  Barcelona 
Process is a European design, even if this is true. There is little reason to 
expect that the process will become more equitable unless there are more 
inputs from the partner countries … [and] civil society actor[s’] …. initiatives 
… need to be exploited 
as well as mobility
8 in the region, e.g. through the introduction of a special ‘Barcelona visa’. 
 
Widening and Deepening of a EMRSSC - Collective Security 
 
Buzan (1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166) introduced the concept of a security community and 
a security complex theory. Security community, according to Buzan (1991, 218) represents the far 
end  on  the  scale  of  security  interdependence,  wherein  “disputes  among  all  the  members  are 
resolved to such an extent that none fears… either political assault or military position on his 
continuum security configurations, related to the idea of a ‘security community’”. A security 
complex  represents  “a  group  of  states  whose  primary  security  concerns  are  linked  together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one 
another (Buzan 1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166).  
                                                           
      
5  This is frequently referred to as the “three basket-structure” of the EMP and which I will refer to occasionally as 
“the paradigm” of the EMP. 
      
6 As an example see Spencer (2001, 19), writing that “without rethinking this kind of exclusion [of relegating 
Palestinian aspirations to democracy and a territorial state to a secondary order of priority by the EU] even short term 
security planning has started to become illusory”. I suggest that the EMP should be considered neither short-term nor  
does every security issue between EMP members be a priority – sometimes for political reasons, the process needs to 
be “re-prioritized” to allow for the right moment to address it properly, even if this means e.g. adjusting the sense of 
Anglo-Saxon “time” with the “sense of time” in MENA: why cry failure when some members have not had sufficient 
time  to  process  all  variables  (considering  the  EMP  relationship  is  one  of  many  political  and  socio-economic 
relationships politicians on both sides of the Mediterranean are balancing against each other?). 
     
7  including a Free Trade Area by 2010 among EMP members 
     
8 These would ideally refer to the “4 Freedoms” (capital, people, goods, and services) in a “perfected” common 
market.  
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         Hence this paper briefly addresses the extent to which the mutual roles of the EU, North 
Africa and the Levant beyond historical ties, and their current economic interests in a security 
context shift from state-centric interests to society and identity, in line with Spencer’s observation 
that the Mediterranean region is an example of the interplay between 
    the destabilizing consequences of uneven economic development in states 
lacking  democratic  accountability  as  a  sub-state-problem,  and  the  trans-
national links of organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, 
drugs and arms as a supranational problem (Spencer 2001, 12). 
 
        The Euro-Mediterranean, according to the parameters outlined by Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde  (1998,  16),  could  be  termed  a  heterogeneous  security  complex,  as  it  abandons  the 
assumption of being locked into specific security sectors, but rather features interactions across 
several sectors such as states, nations, firms (incl. NGOs) and “confederations” (in the widest 
sense, the EU), and across the political, economic, and societal sectors. Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde  (1998,  17)  state  that  there  is  a  “cause-effect  nature  of  the  issues  around  which 
securitization takes place: the ‘facilitating conditions’ for securitization. Second is the process of 
securitization [as the extreme version of politicization] (Ibid., 23) itself”.  
          Security  cooperation  was  envisioned  from  the  EMP’s  beginning  in  terms  of  regional 
inclusiveness and indivisibility (Spence 2001, 16), based on the Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean     
summit’s guidelines of 1999 as the basis for the EMP’s Charter for Peace and Stability
9, positing 
the  EU’s  southern  external  borders  not  in  the  Mediterranean  but  south  of  MENA,  bordering 
Central Asia and the greater Middle East. The debate over the borders of the EU and/or its 
neighborhood  feeds  into  the  debate  over  EU  identity  which  has  only  become  more  sensitive 
during  the  last  two  enlargements  of  2004  and  2007:  “internal  European  identities  are  being 
questioned,  resistance  to  migrant  pressures  is  on  the  increase  [and]  there  is  a  cultural 
defensiveness about the European discourse which is unlikely to favor inclusive gestures further 
afield”  (Spencer  2001,  18).  Beyond  the  debate  of  European  identity  and  cultural  definitions, 
implicit in the context of regional security community and –cooperation, Javier Solana’s (1997, 2, 
quoted in Spencer 2001, 18) pronouncements as then NATO Secretary General of the “common 
space, common concerns and common heritage” also linked Europe to its southern partners. 
            Security Communities (compare Karl Deutsch 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998, Ole Waever 
1995)  as  “zones  of  peace”,  are  based  on  knowledge  (broad  environmental  factors,  e.g. 
demographics, shifts in global economy). This concept provides an ideational epistemic shift 
through the development of new interpretations of social reality/learning (i.e. alternative notions 
of what security is). Thus mutual trust and collective identity (based not only on material, but also 
on social structure) are achieved through social learning. Additionally, institutions can provide 
conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change, e.g. mutual trust and collective identity 
among  the  involved  actors  (e.g.  EMP  member  states).  Hence,  I  argue  in  this  paper  that  the 
security structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions: states are not static 
subjects, but dynamic agents without given identities, that are (re-)constituted through complex, 
historical  overlapping  (if  often  contradictory)  practices,  and  a  tenuous  relationship  between 
domestic and international politics. 
        Hence,  in  Buzan  and  Waever  (2003,  57)  words:  “the  most  relevant  form  of  security 
community contains active and regional securitization, only it is not actor-to-actor (one state 
fearing the other and therefore counter threatening it) but a collective securitization of the overall 
development of the region”. In fact, Buzan and Waever (Ibid., 67) also view Europe as likely to 
                                                           
     
9 Although it has not been adopted, some authors such as Vedrine (quoted in Chourou 2001, 58) suggest that its 
development should be continued. While Chourou (2001, 59) doubts that it could be the independent or even an 
intervening variable affecting peace and stability in the Mediterranean, I would argue that the process of defining this 
“structure” will clarify actor’s goals, expectations – and contribute to the construction of a common regional security 
identity – significant, as I argue in this paper as security is not divisible, especially within a region.  
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moving towards a structured security region “because its internal interaction capacity is much too 
high to permit” an unstructured security region. Chourou (2001, 61) recognizes this concern when 
he writes that “the competence of the EMP in the area of security has been eroding through re-
conceptualization [and] attrition”. The development of a common security identity in the EMP 
had been overshadowed by the breakdown of the Middle East peace process most recently by the 
Palestinian intifada of 2000 and beyond (Ibid.). Consequently, the argument in this paper is that 
the essence of regional security is not about charters but in the processes of a shared commitment 
to  security  region-wide
10  (compare  Hallenberg  2000,  especially  pp.  28).  The  UMed,  as  an 
enhancement  to  the  EMP  to  overcome  its  past  weaknesses,  is  poised  to  contribute  to  this 
paradigm,  
         Collective  security  has  been  referred  to  as  a  condition  or  a  process  of  increasing  the 
probability  that  conflicts  will  be  resolved  without  violence  (Deutsch  1957).  In  this  regional 
security context, integration is occurring when the states involved cease to prepare for war against 
each other (a political pluralistic process leading to the status of “peace” by re-defining interests 
and a commitment to a “new way of life” instead of coercion. This political integration, starting at 
the  elite  level  through  a  convergence  of  goals  and  expectations,  leads  later  to  nonpolitical 
integration, i.e. economic and social welfare.  Hence this paper addresses the extent to which the 
mutual roles of the EU, North Africa and the Levant beyond historical ties and their current 
economic interests in a security context shift from state-centric interests to society and identity. 
The widening of the ENP overall (and the EMP as a sub-group within it) was apparent at the last 
NATO summit, and in the EU’s role in affecting NATO’s enlargement (or pausing thereof, as the 
case was) (Williamson 2008).  
         Wendt  (1999)  pointed  out  “that  the  structures  of  human  association  are  determined 
primarily by shared ideas rather than [simply] material forces” (Pace 2003, 167)
11. Applying these 
dynamics to discourses about and within regions, Wendt (Ibid.) argues that identities and interests 
of  (state)  actors  are  constructed  by  shared  ideas  rather  than  primordially  or  automatically 
predetermined by history or geography for example, nor are they simply a distribution of material 
capabilities  as  neo-realists  hold,  or  simply  a  function  of  institutions,  as  neo-liberals  would 
emphasize.  
          Europe  and  its  southern  neighbors  have  shared  over  the  millennia  common  security 
concerns,  though  they  were  not  always  solved  satisfactorily.  The  significance  of  regional 
stability, especially in the context of the Mediterranean security, is not simply a “flavor du jour” 
with respect to the foreign policy of the EU, but very much essential in analyzing the regions 
beyond it, i.e. stability in post-war Iraq (including intra-regional conflict) and the possibility of a 
fourth Gulf War
12, or e.g. pertaining to socio-political stability towards a new “Silk Road”. Buzan 
and Waever (2003, 53) consider boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction as 
essential in a regional security complex. EU integration of member states is not experienced as a 
threat to national identity, but rather an affirmation according to “unity in diversity”
13. In the past 
it  has  held  true  frequently  that  “the  relationship  with  the  Other  as  a  different  entity  is  most 
problematic not with those who are very distant, but with those who are closest” (Amin Maalous 
in “In the name of identity”, quoted in Bensalah and Daniel, 2003, 12).  
         As the EMP has clear security and defense implications, the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) has reciprocally a Mediterranean dimension (Heisbourg 2001, 5). However, while 
the Barcelona process is primarily concerned with soft security, the ESDP will involve hard 
                                                           
     
10 Compare the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950: “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of 
creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”. 
      
11  A security threat in MENA would impact EU identity for example (Pace 2003, 167). 
      
12 The First Gulf War viewed by many Middle Easterners as the one between Iran and Iraq in the late 1900s, the 
Second Gulf War being  Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Third Gulf War being the recent U.S. 
intervention in Iraq. 
      
13 In contrast to the U.S.’ motto of “ex pluribus unum”  
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security approaches. Pertaining to the Mediterranean, beyond border patrol, it is in coordination 
with  NATO’s  Mediterranean  Dialogue  to  address  security  threats.  These  developments  in 
conjunction with the UN intervention in Kosovo have caused considerable anxiety in MENA 
about  the  validity  of  their  state  sovereignty  (Joffé  2001,  52)  and  expressed  themselves  in  a 
reluctance to “share” security within the Mediterranean. The EMP, as a soft power approach to 
security in the Mediterranean, is able to by-pass this reluctance and approach collective security 
in this region. 
         In terms of neighborhood security, however, limited cooperation has been offered by the EU 
under the ESDP to certain ENP members (e.g. Russia, Ukraine and the non-EU European NATO 
members, such as Turkey) (Schumacher 2004, 96; Biscop 2003, 186-8; and Vasconcelos 2004,6). 
Hence the blurring between EU hard and soft security between the ENP and the EMP vis-à-vis its 
neighbors becomes apparent. The role of NATO through its Mediterranean Dialogue could be 
integrated into the image of a EuroMed regional security complex by extrapolating this region 
transatlantically whereby the Mediterranean regional security complex could hypothetically be 
viewed as a supercomplex with the inclusion of North America
14. The role of NATO in forging “a 
pan-European  security  culture  that  has  never  before  existed”  (de  Hoop  Scheffer  2008,  2)  in 
Europe, and points to the strong disposition towards cooperation in tackling common security 
challenges (Ibid.). It could  also point to a “Third Generation Regionalism” (van Langenhove 
2008)  as  indication  of  a  EMRSSC,  with  its  “tailored  cooperation”,  e.g.  in  improving  the 
protection of security of critical energy infrastructures by “complementing existing national and 
international efforts to maintain the flow of vital resources” (de Hoop Scheffer 2008, 4), and 
protect  against  proliferation  threats  and  vulnerabilities  in  energy  supply  –  even  if  the 
heterogeneity within the EU itself was clearly expressed at the recent NATO summit, i.a. in its 
uneven support of its Eastern expansion. While in terms of a Regional Security Super Complex 
the future hegemonic influence of the U.S. is questioned by some authors (compare Singh 2008), 
the unique security challenges and realignments, formulated e.g. by Kissinger (as quoted in the 
beginning of this paper), do not invite a de-coupling among a EMRSSC, but a strengthening of 
inter-regional  relations.  This  would  be  true  among  those  directly  or  indirectly  particularly 
vulnerable,  such  as  those  surrounding  the  Mediterranean,  e.g.  with  respect  to  securing  and 
diversifying energy and export routes inter-regionally (EurActiv, 11 April 2008). 
        This deepening of the EMRSSC, which Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, 5) also alluded to past 
the  strategic  differences  between  the  U.S.  and  the  EU  towards  the  Mediterranean.  However, 
recent  changes  in  U.S.  policies  towards  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  on  the  Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, based on “a successful exit strategy from Iraq could in fact contribute 
to narrowing the transatlantic gap” (Ibid.) in the triangular nature (in Aliboni and Qatarneh’s 
words)  of  Mediterranean  relations  (i.e.  a  Euro-Mediterranean  regional  security  complex?) 
between the U.S., the EU and the Arab states. One might view as an “out-of-area” - or neo-
hegemonic?  -  institutional  consequence  of  Euro-Mediterranenan  Regional  Security  Super 
Complex activity the recent meeting between U.S. president Bush and Russian Prime Minister 
Putin at Sochi to discuss a replacement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), limiting 
the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads (Fidler and Blitz 2008). And while Washington 
had traditionally viewed the EU’s plans to develop independent military capabilities as lessening 
their NATO commitments, the U.S. appears to welcome the complementarity between the ESDP 
and the U.S.’s hard power capabilities now (Fidler and Blitz 2008). This transatlantic mutual 
acceptance, even benediction, of NATO military capabilities is reflected by the call from the EU, 
exemplified by French President Sarkozy in France’s bid to re-join the alliance (The Economist 
April 3, 2008).  
                                                           
     
14 This would not affect Buzan and Waever’s view of a North American regional security complex, but 
simply the overlap between the Euro-Med and the North American regional security complexes.  
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           A  further  extension  of  the  ENP  is  the  EU-Africa  Strategic  Partnership  (European 
Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007) to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, 
ranging from climate change to development, energy, migration, peace and security, trade and 
regional  integration  and  good  governance  human  rights,  between  the  countries  beyond  the 
southern Mediterranean and the EU. While the future geographic and political ENP-membership 
may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), the ENP’s potential is not
15.           
         Joffé  recognizes  the  reciprocity  between  the  evolution  of  societal  values  and  political 
change, but he discounts the role of institutions in this process. I would point out Alexander 
Wendt’s (1999) and Ruggie’s (1998) arguments concerning the co-constitution of identities (e.g. 
societal,  political),  actors  and  structures  (e.g.  institutions)  as  the  process  for  social,  political, 
economic  etc.  change.  This  reciprocal  “construction”  of  a  regional  security  identity  within  a 
EMRSC then has traditional military components, but is also perception-based components (as 
social constructivists would argue) which co-constitute structures. A pertinent example would be 
the regional security implications of the current global financial crisis. This economic threat has 
the potential for severe political consequences (as did the economic crisis of 1929 for the Weimar 
Republic). Beck (2008, 2) writes that “the traditional methods of management and control are 
proving unreliable and ineffective in the face of global risks… the social and political explosive 
force  of  global  markets  risks  is  becoming  palpable.  Governments  are  overthrown,  civil  wars 
become a threat.” 
         Analyzing  the  EMP  within  a  EMRSSC  from  a  multi-level  governance  perspective, 
organized around multiple foci (national and supra-national) rather than simply as a homogeneous 
integration process would also be an additional perspective for analysis of the EMP. It could be 
viewed  as  a  multi-layered  and  polycentric  (Schmitter  and  Karl  1991)  governance,  not  as  a 
“regional-state”, but possibly a new polity species, such as a neo-Westphalian regional integration 
construct,  where  national  preferences  are  not  fixed  but  co-constituted  between  agent-  and 
structure  through  processes  such  as  preference  aggregation/convergence/transformation  (Prugl 
and  Locher)  made  more  compatible  and  legally  binding  through  regulatory,  judicial  and 
legislative channels (“Networks”) (Slaughter 2004). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Buzan (1991, 188) states that “in security terms, ‘region’ means that a distinct and significant 
subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been 
locked into geographical proximity with each other”. The EMP’s mandate is based on the mutual 
political, economic and culturally strategic significance between the Mediterranean region and the 
EU,  and  seeks  to  develop  a  relationship  between  its  partners  based  on  “comprehensive 
cooperation  and  solidarity,  in  keeping  with  the  privileged  nature  of  the  links  forged  by 
neighbourhood and history (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona declaration). 
        This  paper  has  expanded  the  theoretical  concept  of  a  Middle  Eastern  Regional  Security 
Complex (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature e.g. on security, regional integration, 
development and global governance towards a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex 
(EMRSC). The center of a EMRSC lies in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, rather than 
in MENA as Buzan and Waever (Ibid., map 1) proposed. The buffer states of a EMRSC would be 
e.g. the eastern EU neighborhood states (in contrast to Scandinavia and the Balkans as Buffer 
States in a MERSC). The insulator states of a EMRSC would be i.a. equatorial Africa, a super-
and great power would be Russia, a subcomplex would be e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
with an Asian supercomplex (compare Ibid.).   
        While some authors have pointed to the hesitancy of the southern Mediterranean towards the 
north, regional economic integration is not new to the Mediterranean, but was present extensively 
                                                           
      
15 Compare Senyucel et al. 2006.  
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e.g. between the Venetian and the Middle East trades for at least one millennium, prevailing 
economically when political and military harmony had ceased (Spence 2007): EMP members 
today need to reach a consensus on – and a renewed commitment to - the need for change within 
a broader framework of a national development or reform program (Wurzel 2003, 8) in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. The proposed UMed would have the potential to fill the insufficiencies in 
all security sectors existing within the current EMP.      
          It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New 
World Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a 
neo-regionalism  appears  to  be  developing  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  including  the  Euro-
Mediterranean, with the potential for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach 
new and old security threats of partner countries – and to perhaps allay the fear of an all-too 
powerful America being replaced by a fear of its imminent weakening (British Council 2008). 
           This paradigm would fit Van Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third 
Regionalism”, whereby the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences 
of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive engaging 
in  inter-regional  arrangements  and  agreements,  going  beyond  purely  trade  issues  with  a 
multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. 
And  finally,  in  third  generation  regional  integration,  regions  would  become  more  actively 
engaged at the U.N. The EMP’s potential in contributing to regional security and stability, due to 
it s brief thirteen years’ existence, is still nascent, but significant in consolidating the competing 
preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional 
structures existing today in the (transatlantic) Euro-Mediterranean “region”.  
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